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February 1, 1972
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Judiciary Committee
Constitutional Convention
State Capitol Building
Helena, Montana 59601

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:
In response to your request that I provide in writing the
comments which I made in testifying before your committee
on January 27, 1972 the following summary is submitted:
RECOMMENDATIONS

First I would like to state that in general I support our
present Constitutional article on the judiciary, particularly
in its system of elective judges at all levels from the
supreme court through the district court and including the
justice of the peace courts,
I certainly appreciate the efforts and join with those who
wish to upgrade justice in the state of Montana particularly
at the lower court level, however I view it as primarily
an economic problem. The supreme court and district judges
must be paid substantial salaries while in office and quality
and competency of the justice level of courts will be directly
related to the compensation provided.

Specifically I recommend retaining the constitutional dignity
of an elective justice of the peace court level.

However, I believe that we must remove the constitutional
requirement of two justices per township and rather should
authorize and direct the legislature to establish as many
justice of the peace courts and in such location as they deem
proper.
In order to provide flexibility I likewise believe that the
constitutional limitation of the jurisdiction Oi the justice
courts ought to be removed and that left to the legislature.
This, of course, would permit the legislature to accomodate
and provide a justice level court system which would be flex
ible enough to meet the demands of our rural population areas
and be variable enough so that the legislature could satisfy
the demands of our larger cities.
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I likewise believe that the legislature should be authorized
and directed to set minimum standards of education training
and salary and whenever possible provide office space in the
court house commensurate with the number and locations of the
justice courts to be established.

In addition I believe that it is essential to preserve the
right of appeal from a justice of the peace court determination
to a district court which is far less costly and far more
practicable than the requirement of the Montana plan, which I
will discuss next, and which plan would require that the only
appeal from a magistrate level decision would be to the Supreme
Court of the state of Montana.

MONTANA PLAN
Because this committee has before it a proposal which would
substantially change our present Montana Constitution relating
to the judiciary I will comment on my impressions in studying
this plan from the point oi view of my capacity as a practicing
small town Montana attorney.
My fundamental objection to the Montana plan is that in my
opinion it violates the basic principles of our United Spates
Constitution which guarantees, in Article IV, Section 4, a
republican form of government which of course is a form of
government whereby the people are governed by those whom they
choose. The basic structure of the Montana plan substitutes
an appointive judic ary selected by an appointive committee
for our present constitutional system of electing judges by
the people.

Under our democratic form of government I believe that those
who propose change have the burden of persuading those to
whom the changes are proposed of the validity of their proposal.
I strongly believe that there is no justification for taking
away the peoples right to vote and substituting therefore an
appointive system.
In reviewing the Montana plan I find many areas where the new
proposed system would be subject to abuses that are not possible
under our preyent system; I am not, I emphasize, indicating that
powers contained in the Montana plan would be abused, however,
I feel obligated to point out those areas in which there are
substantial differences from the present system.

section 2 of the Montana plan grants to the supreme court general
supervisory and administrative control over all inferior courts.
The Montana Supreme Court presently has general supervisory
control which of course means that the Supreme Court can direct
a district court to refrain from doing something which it ought
not to do or to direct a district court to do something which
it ought to do.
However the addition of administrative control
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over the district court presents the opportunity for substantial
changes in power from our present system. The comment to Section
2 states that the addition of administrative control as well as
supervisory control makes no substantial change and with this
I disagree strongly. The administrative power of Section 2
could enable the supreme court to assign district judges any
where in the state at their desire.
Both Dean Sullivan of the
University of Montana Law School and Mr. Bill Bellingham,
President of the Montana Bar Association, testified before this
committee that inherent in the plan is the power of the supreme
court to administratively assign district judges anywhere that
the supreme court desire.
This administrative power could be
abused in such a manner as to permit a supreme court which should
happen to desire to remove a particular district judge the
ability to do so by simply assigning him from one end of the
state to the next and insuring that he would never be reassigned
to his residence. More importantly, should a district judge
feel tnat the administrative power were being abused a district
judge would have no appeal other than that to the same "admin
istrative" authority which he felt was abusing its power.

Section 3 of the Montana plan authorizes the supreme court to
appoint an administrative director. This could result in an
appointive administrator exercising substantial authority over
the judiciary of Montana.
That this is not merely an idle
suspicion on my part is illustrated by information contained
in a report by Dean Sullivan to the Citizens Conference plan
for improvement of the Montana judicial system at Billings,
Montana, on December 7, 1971.
That report refers to a recent
report by an advisory commission on intergovernmental relations
dealing with state local relations in the criminal justice
system.
That report further recites that some of the recom
mendations of that committee are apropos to the Montana plan.
The commission further recommends that all courts be subject
to administrative supervision and that all states provide an
administrative office of the state courts headed by a professional
administrator.
To me this certainly sounds like the administra
tive director as referred co in the Montana plan and when
considered with the proposed administrative control as set forth
in Section 2 would give an appointive administrative official
substantial control and power over the district courts of this
state which I believe to be fundamentally wrong.
Section 4 grants to the supreme court the powers to make rules
of evidence which shall have the force of an effective law.
It
is a substantial change from 'ur present system whereby the
elected legislature enacts rules of evidence by statute and
amounts to a substantial violation of the democratic doctrine
of separation of powers.
Rule 4 would give the supreme court the
power to legislate by making the rules of evidence now reserved
to the legislative, the executive power of enforcing the rules,
as well as the judicial power of interpreting the rules.
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Section 6 of the Montana plan would permit the legislature to
increase the number of associate justices to six and which
power could be abused by a legislature to impose its legislative
philosophy upon a court which at any particular time might be
evenly divided in its philosophy.
Section 7 of the Montana plan changes the Clerk of the Supreme
Court from an elective state official to an appointive position.
Again this is taking away from the people of Montana the right
to vote for their public officials.

Section 9 of the Montana plan provides for the creation of the
position of magistrate. Although the creation of each magistrace
position by a district judge would initially have to be approved
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, after each respec
tive magistrate's position is created the Montana plan could
be subject to abuses. Section 9 provides that the appointing
judge will establish the compensation of magistrates appointed
by him with the apparent limitation being only the imagination.
Section 9 further grants magistrates full jurisdiction of the
district courts in all matters excepting only criminal cases
amounting to felonies. The district judge under this system
could quite simply appoint a magistrate, fix his salary at
$75,000 per year and then give to that appointed magistrate
all civil, probate, and misdemeanor criminal cases reserving
unto the district judge only the trial of felonies. The com
ment to Section 9 refers to the exercise of a limited portion
of the district courts jurisdiction, but the section itself is
unlimited in its grant of jurisdiction excepting only felonies.
Section 10 of the Montana plan would enable the supreme court
to increase or decrease the number of judges in a judicial
district and to redistrict the state subject only to rejection
by the next succeeding legislature.
This power to increase the
number of judges and determine their locations presently rests
with our elective legislature which is where that power properly
belongs.

Section 11 of the Montana plan changes the clerk of the district
court from an elected public official to one appointed by the
district judge. The clerk of the district court provides
substantial public services other than acting as clerk for the
district judges while court is in session.
In addition Section
11 provides that deputy clerks are likewise appointed by the
judge which would have the effect of having them come directly
underneath the district judge rather than the clerk for whom
the deputies presumably work. The comment to Section 11 simply
recites that this section follows the pattern of appointment
to which I would add, in lieu of election by the people.

Section 12 of the Montana plan refers to certain qualifications
for magistrates and permits the appointment of non law qualified
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persons to the position of magistrate. This system works quite
well under our present justice courts which of course have
limited jurisdiction; however the Montana plan would permit
magistrates without any legal training to have full unlimited
civil, probate, and misdemeanor trial jurisdiction excepting
only the trial of felonies.

Section 12 further provides that district judges and magistrates
need not be residents of the districts for which they are chosen
at the time of their appointment and requires only that they
shall reside in the district for which chosen.
This could
permit all future judges and magistrates in the state of Montana
to come from a single city or location or permit a rotation
system of choosing judges from the major population centers of
the state without any regard for the area in which a vacancy
occurs and without any opportunity for the people who will
come under the judicial jurisdiction of the particular judge
to express their views.
In addition Section 12, although it
requires a judge to reside in the district for which he was
chosen, does not necessarily mean the district to which judge
will be assigned for his judicial duties by the supreme court.
For example this section, combined with the administrative
powers in Section 2, could permit a district judge to be ap
pointed from Missoula to fill a vacancy in Butte anu, providing
the judge established a residency in Butte, he could thereafter
be assigned to judicial duties back in Missoula.
Section 13 of tie Montana plan provides for the creation of a
non-partisan judicial council in a manner to be provided by the
legislature. This initially at least has the appearance of
having some safeguards as the judicial council would be selected
by the elected representatives of the people.
However after
the judicial council is elected under the Montana plan the
judicial council is then directed to appoint two committees, a
nominating committee and a research and qualifications committee
neither of which committee would have to be composed of any
members of the judicial council and the Montana plan provides
no minimum requirements or qualifications for selecting members
of these two committees other than restricting the membership
to be non-legislative, executive or judicial officers. The
nominating committee for example could be all of one political
persuasion or all from one geegraphic section of the state and
thereafter would have full power to nominate all future judges
in the state of Montana. This appointive committee under the
Montana plan can nominate two and nor more than four nominees
for judgeships and from which list the governor would be required
to select the judge.
This of course as a practical matter
permits the nominating committee itself to select a judge by
simply nominating one person whom they would desire to be the
judge followed by three nominees of limited standing in their
bar or community.
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Said Section 13 likewise refers to an uncontested general
election for the retention or rejection of a judge who desired
to remain in office. A distinguished attorney in Polson,
Montana, Mr. Floren Hamman, who was practicing law before I
was born has compared this to the Russian system of elections
whereby only one name appears on the ballot.
I cannot believe
that any district or supreme court judge would ever be removed
on a ballot where there was not a competent judicial candidate
in opposition to the incumbent. Under the Montana plan if there
should happen to be an incompetent judge seeking reelection I
simply cannot believe that any lawyers or citizens of good stand
ing in any community would walk up and down main street campaign
ing against an incompetent district judge and asking the people
to vote against him. As contrasted by the present system if
there should happen to be an incompetent incumbent judge seeking
reelection the members of the bar and community can and will
campaign in favor of a qualified candidate running in opposition
to the incumbent.

The research and qualifications committee provided for in
Section 13 constitutes a complete destruction of our doctrine
of separation of powers in that it gives this appointive com
mittee power to investigate, which is an executive prerogative,
power to determine the basis for retirement censure or removal,
which of course is a legislative function and the power to
conduct hearings subpoena witnesses and which proceedings are
of course judiciary in nature. The section goes to extreme
lengths to provide virtually unlimited power in an appointive
committee to review the qualifications and recommend che removal
of judges but no-where in the Montana plan .is there any power
for the people of Montana or any elected officials to investi
gate or remove the "committee" which need not have any qualifi
cations and for which no provision for removal or review are
made.
The comment to Section 13 states that its purpose is to provide
a merit system of selection and retention and relieve justices
and judges from political pressures.
Under our present Montana
system I would like to think that election by the people is
c system of merit selection and the only political pressure
ipon a present candidate for the judiciary is to persuade the
voters that he would be a competent judge.
Under the Montana
plan political pressure might well be shifted away from
justices and judges and concentrated instead upon the "com
mittee". The comment to Section 13 further provides that the
plan is designed to protect against continuance in office of
any incompetent or unethical judge which I submit is now done
by the elective process rather than the committee system which
would be its substitute under the Montana plan.

Section 15 to the Montana plan as an addition to our present
provisions would permit mileage, per diem and salary which
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could of course encourage a centralized magistrate system in
the larger population centers with traveling magistrates to
administer justice in lieu of our present resident justices
selected by the people in the districts served.

Section 17 of the Montana plan of ourse contains a "grand
father clause" by permitting incumbent supreme court justices
and district court judges to remain in office unless rejected,
removed or retired by the research and qualifications com
mittee provided in the Montana plan.
In concluding my specific comments about the Montana plan I
would like to again refer to the report given by Dean Sullivan
at Billings and apply the criticisms there in made to our
present system and show how they are more applicable to the
Montana plan.

Dean Sullivan states that there is a simple answer to the
objection that the selection of judges should not be taken
from the people and that is the people don't have an effective
voice now.
I submit that the people won't have any voice
under the Montana plan as the entire power to elect and retain
judges lies within an appointive committee over which no one
has control.
The criticism is then made of our present system that four or
five justices of the supreme court were appointed initially
and that nineteen of our 28 district judges were appointed
initially.
This ignores the fact that under the Montana plan
all will be appointed and further ignores the fact that obvi
ously one of the five justices of the supreme court and nine
of the twenty eight district judges were initially chosen by
election by the people and which right would forever more be
barred by the Montana plan. Further criticising the present
system Dean Sullivan recites that district judges have run for
election and have been elected in most instances.
This of
course ignores the most recent general election held in November
of 1970 in which an appointive judge in the fifth judicial
district ran for reelection, was opposed by another member of
the local bar, and the appointed incumbent was defeated in an
election in which the people of that district exercised their
right to vote and determine who will be their judge.

Further commenting on Dean Sullivan's criticism of our present
system he states that we presently have an appointed judiciary
with no limitation upon the governor.
I apply that criticism
to the. Montana plan in which we would have an appointive
judiciary with no limitation upon the "committee'.'.
Dean
Sullivan states that under the present plan the governor is not
required to seek the advise or counsel of any one and that he
may appoint anyone he wishes without determining the status of
that individual or determining the judicial demeanor or
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temperment of that individual. Under the Montana plan the
"committee" is not required to seek the advise or counsel or
anyone and the "committee" may appoint anyone they wish likewise
without determining the status of that individual or determining
the judicial demeanor or temperment of that individual.
Criti
cism of our present plan is further extended to state that there
have been few contested elections and fewer instances where
judges have been turned out of office to which I reply that the
likely reason is that we have a distinguished judiciary in the
state of Montana and under the Montana plan there would be no
contested elections and none would be turned out of office.

The objection to our present system is continued by stating
that our present system of impeachment is unworkable and that
the unfitness of a judge, where it exists, seldom is a matter
of common knowledge. My reply to that is that although impeach
ment may be unworkable it affords a better opportunity that the
Montana plan of running unopposed and if the unfitness of a
judge under the present system is seldom a matter of common
knowledge it will not be more a matter of common knowledge
under the Montana plan and is evidence in itself that it is
extremely unlikely that any judge would ever be defeated in
an uncontested election. The third objection recited by Dean
Sullivan to the present judicial article is that it is contrary
to the facts when it is stated that the present organization
of our courts is adequate and working well.
I submit that this
is not true. The supreme court of the State of Montana is
undoubtedly more current m holding its hearings and rendering
its decisions than at any prior time in history and it is at
least the equal to any supreme court in the United States. The
district courts likewise are current and effective and should
there be any isolated instances in which the case load exceeds
the capacity of the resident judge provisions are made in our
present system whereby the elected representatives of the
people, the legislature, can create additional districts or
additional judges to be elected for existing judicial districts.
Dean Sullivan further criticizes the present judicial system
by stating that there presently is no direct citizen partici
pation.
I strongly believe that our present system of electing
judges is the most direct means of citizen participation possible.
The final objection to the present plan has merit and as I've
indicated at the beginning of my recommendation I heartily
agree that justice court level of our judiciary should be up
graded as I have suggested.
I heartily disagree that it is
necessary to take away from the people their right to vote for
those whom will administer their justice and replace that system
by appointment by committee.
In conclusion I would like to quote from a newspaper article
in the Daily Missoulian of January 6, 1970 in which Montana
District Judge E. Gardner Brownlee was referring to his efforts
to conduct training sessions in an attempt to upgrade the
level of our justice of the peace courts. Judge Brownlee was
therein quoted as saying "Dean Sullivan recently referred to
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our efforts as a band-aid on a broken leg .
for the broken leg is complete amputation."

His remedy

I would add that the Montana plan offers a transplant in
which the new limb is controlled by a committee rather than
the body it is supposed to support.

Respectfully submitted,

C. B. McNeil
Delegate - District 17

